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1. Introduction 
In May 2005, Tony Blair said ‘Nuclear power is back on the agenda with a vengeance’1. His chief 
scientific adviser and other government spokespeople suggested that up to 20 new nuclear units 
would be needed. This was taken by many, internationally, as a signal that the UK was about to 
launch an aggressive new programme of nuclear power stations. However, in evidence to a 
Parliamentary Select Committee, the Energy Minister, Malcolm Wicks said
2
: 
‘It is not for government to say that we shall have X nuclear reactors and so on. Government will not be 
building nuclear reactors, will not say they want X number of nuclear reactors. I always thought myself 
that if at the moment one fifth of our electricity is from nuclear, if the market came forward with 
something to replicate that broadly in the future, from my own point of view it seems to me that would 
make a useful contribution to the mix. We are not going to do anything to facilitate that, nor this 
percentage nor that percentage.’ 
Subsequently, after a challenge by Greenpeace, the High Court found in February 2007 that the 
government’s consultation process on nuclear power was inadequate and had to be repeated. ‘Mr 
Justice Sullivan said that the consultation exercise was "seriously flawed and that the process was 
manifestly inadequate and unfair" because insufficient information had been made available by 
the Government for consultees to make an "intelligent response".’3 
The government’s Green Paper on energy published in May 2007 therefore made no specific 
commitments on nuclear power. However, one of Gordon Brown’s first statements as the Prime 
Minister in June 2007 seemed to pre-empt the consultation. He told Parliament on July 4 that
4
: 
‘…we have made the decision to continue with nuclear power, and … the security of our energy supply 
is best safeguarded by building a new generation of nuclear power stations.’ 
A new consultation was announced in May 2007 and was closed to submissions in October 2007. 
In January 2008, the government announced the result of the consultation, which again favoured 
new nuclear construction. The new White Paper stated: 
‘Set against the challenges of climate change and security of supply, the evidence in support of new 
nuclear power stations is compelling.’5 
The commitment not to provide subsidies was reiterated: 
‘It will be for energy companies to fund, develop and build new nuclear power stations in the UK, 
including meeting the full costs of decommissioning and their full share of waste management costs.’6 
The utilities most likely to build nuclear plants, EDF and E.ON both supported the suggestion 
that subsidies would not be needed. Vincent de Rivaz, CEO of EDF Energy (UK) said: ‘We have 
made it clear we are not asking for subsidies, all costs will be borne by us.’7 While E.ON said in a 
                                       
1 ‘Blair to push for new wave of nuclear construction in UK’ Nucleonics Week, 18 May 2006 
2 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmtrdind/uc1123-vii/uc112302.htm  
3 Greenpeace (2007) ‘Government's nuclear plans declared unlawful by High Court’ Greenpeace Press 
Release, 15 February, 2007 http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/media/press-releases/governments-nuclear-
plans-declared-unlawful-by-high-court  
4 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070704/debtext/70704-
0003.htm#07070441001017  
5
 Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2008) ‘Meeting the Energy Challenge: A 
White Paper on Nuclear Power’ Cm 7296, HMSO, p 8. http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file43006.pdf  
6 Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2008) ‘Meeting the Energy Challenge: A 
White Paper on Nuclear Power’ Cm 7296, HMSO, p 10. 
7 Utility Week (2008) ‘Going nuclear’ February 1, 2008. 
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press release: ‘It also believes that there is no requirement for either government subsidies or for a 
guaranteed long-term cost of carbon to make new nuclear power stations economic.’8 
This confidence is in contrast to the situation in the USA where the government has committed 
billions of dollars to subsidies for new nuclear plants and where industry has frequently stated 
that new nuclear plants without subsidies and guarantees would not be feasible. For example, in 
December 2007, Christopher Crane, President of Exelon Generation, one of the utilities that has 
stated an intention to build new nuclear plants stated: ‘If the loan guarantee program is not in 
place by 2009, we will not go forward’9 This report examines whether the ‘free market’ really 
will build new nuclear power plants in the UK without strong support from public funds other 
than a few enabling measures, for example, on licensing reactor designs. In the second section, 
we review what commitments the UK government has actually made. 
In the third section, we look at why owning and operating a nuclear power plant is so 
economically risky and what the specific risks are. In Section 4, we look at the UK’s track record 
with nuclear power, an important criterion used by the financial community to judge investment 
risk. This shows that nuclear power has a poor record in the UK. Financial costs to electricity 
consumers and taxpayers for this have been high, but, at least as important, the opportunity cost 
of placing resources in fruitless nuclear expansion programmes has also been high. If these 
resources had gone into developing renewables and energy efficiency programmes, the UK would 
be much close to making its electricity supply system sustainable. 
In Section 5, we look at experience in Finland and the USA with attempts to re-launch nuclear 
power programmes. The order of the Olkiluoto 3 plant was portrayed by nuclear advocates as a 
demonstration that nuclear orders were possible in a liberalised electricity market without 
subsidy. However, closer examination of the terms of the deal show a number of apparent 
subsidies while experience with the first two years of construction of the plant have been very 
poor reinforcing how economically risky nuclear power plants are. The Bush US government has 
been trying to re-launch nuclear ordering using federal subsidies to kick-start the process with a 
handful of new plants. Ordering was then expected to be self-sustaining. However, it is becoming 
clear that the subsidy and guarantee programme would have to be open-ended if nuclear orders 
beyond a handful of heavily subsidised units are to be placed. 
In the sixth section we examine claims that use of financial instruments, such as bonds could 
mean that the problems of dealing with economic risk could be overcome at low cost. In the final 
section, we look at what guarantees and subsidies companies hoping to build nuclear power 
plants in Britain might seek and what the cost to the public might be. 
Issues of decommissioning and waste disposal have received a great deal of publicity in the UK. 
There have been extensive debates on whether the government’s commitment that ‘the full costs 
of decommissioning and their full share of waste management costs’ would be borne by energy 
companies really ensured that taxpayers would not subsidise these processes. 
However, while the cost of these processes is high and is very uncertain, the fact that they do not 
take place for up to a century or more after the plant is built means that in any normal economic 
appraisal, these costs are discounted away. Ensuring that adequate financial arrangements are in 
place for decommissioning and waste disposal is therefore an important issue from a public 
policy point of view, but the cost of these arrangements is not likely to be a major item for a 
company in its decision whether to build new nuclear plants. There is therefore only limited 
coverage of waste and decommissioning issues in this paper. 
                                       
8 E.ON (2008) ‘E.ON welcomes new nuclear to UK mix’ E.ON Press Release, January 10, 2008. 
http://pressreleases.eon-uk.com/blogs/eonukpressreleases/archive/2008/01/10/1165.aspx  
9 ‘Loan Guarantees Tagged As Key For Nuclear Builds’ Power, Finance and Risk, December 21, 2007. 
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2. What has the government promised on subsidies 
and guarantees? 
The statement by Tony Blair that Nuclear power is back on the agenda with a vengeance’ caught 
the headlines but it contains no specific promises. The government’s more precise statements are 
less aggressive. 
The 2006 Review stated:
10
 
‘Any new nuclear power stations would be proposed, developed, constructed and operated by the 
private sector, who would also meet full decommissioning costs and their full share of long-term waste 
management costs. The Government does not take a view on the future relative costs of different 
generating technologies. It is for the private sector to make these judgements, within the market 
framework established by government. The actual costs and economics of new nuclear will depend on, 
amongst other things, the contracts into which developers enter, and their cost of capital for financing 
the project.’ 
In evidence to the Trade and Industry Select Committee, the Energy Minister, Malcolm Wicks
11
, 
was blunter
12
. 
‘It is not for government to say that we shall have X nuclear reactors and so on. Government will not be 
building nuclear reactors, will not say they want X number of nuclear reactors. I always thought myself 
that if at the moment one fifth of our electricity is from nuclear, if the market came forward with 
something to replicate that broadly in the future, from my own point of view it seems to me that would 
make a useful contribution to the mix. We are not going to do anything to facilitate that, nor this 
percentage nor that percentage.’ 
And in response to a question on subsidies: (‘Is that the Government’s position? No direct 
subsidies and no indirect subsidies. Am I clear on that?’), he said: 
‘No cheques will be written, there will be no sweetheart deals.’ 
And 
‘No, there will not be any special fiscal arrangements for nuclear. It should not be a surprise, with 
respect, because we have said it very clearly in the Energy Review. You could pursue this if you wanted 
by saying that nuclear waste is quite a complex subject and we are going to look very carefully at that to 
make sure that the full costs of new nuclear waste are paid by the market.’ 
The main concession was on licensing: 
The idea of pre-licensing is that you can say here is a wind farm, here is a nuclear reactor or a gas-
powered station let us pre-license it so that the regulators are satisfied that it is safe and all the other 
things as a piece of kit. Then the local inquiry can purely be about local issues rather than becoming a 
national or international occasion to re-open the whole debate about whether windmills or nuclear are 
desirable. That is what we are trying to do. 
2.1 Decommissioning 
The only apparent exception to the no-subsidies and guarantees rule concerns the arrangements 
for waste disposal. In February 2008, the government launched a ‘Consultation on Funded 
                                       
10 Department of Trade and Industry (2006) ‘The Energy Challenge: Energy Review Report’ Cm 6887, 
HMSO, p 113. http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file31890.pdf  
11 Malcolm Wicks was subsequently moved to the Science and Innovation portfolio in the Department of 
trade and Industry (DTI), but under the Brown administration, the DTI became the Department for 
Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform and Wicks was again made responsible for Energy.  
12 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmtrdind/uc1123-vii/uc112302.htm  
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Decommissioning Programme Guidance for New Nuclear Power Stations’13. The title is 
misleading as the report covers waste disposal costs as well decommissioning and the proposals 
represent a significant departure from previous expectations relate on waste disposal as well as on 
decommissioning. 
On decommissioning, the government is proposing that companies would have to: 
 ‘Demonstrate detailed and costed plans for decommissioning, waste management and 
disposal, before they even begin construction of a nuclear power station;  
 Set money aside into a secure and independent fund from day one of generating 
electricity; and  
 Have additional security in place to supplement the Fund should it be insufficient, for 
example, if the power station closes early.’ 
If these proposals are carried through with adequate measures to ensure that if estimated 
decommissioning costs increase, the companies will be required to make sufficient additional 
contributions to make up the shortfall, they appear a good base. However, closer examination 
reveals a number of issues not well accounted for. 
On timing, the proposals assume the plant will operate for 40 years. This will be followed by a 
seven-year defuelling period. Stage 1 then follows, taking five years; stage 2, is forecast to take a 
further five years; stage 3 is expected to take ten years; and final site clearance six years. So the 
elapsed time from plant closure to end of decommissioning is 37 years. This is a welcome 
shortening compared to the proposals for existing British plants, which is currently based on 
timescales of in excess of 100 years from plant closure to completion of decommissioning. 
Little guidance is given on discounting. For example, no indication of the level of discount rate 
that can be assumed is shown, nor is it specified how long into the future liabilities can be 
discounted for. However, the area where it appears a guarantee is expected is in the following 
paragraph (Consultation, p 16): 
‘We anticipate that operators will request that the Government provide them with a fixed unit price at 
the time they seek approval for their Funded Decommissioning Programme. This will occur alongside 
the regulators’ licensing and permitting processes. At this time, the Secretary of State would use the 
cost modelling methodology it has developed, together with information from the NDA’s parametric 
cost modelling work on the estimated costs of disposal facilities, to determine the fixed unit price, 
including the appropriate risk premium. The cost modelling methodology is described in greater detail 
at paragraphs 4.5.1 – 4.5.39 and further information on when we expect to be in a position to set a fixed 
unit price for operators is set out in the Roadmap paragraphs 2.25 – 2.32 and Table 2. To help future 
operators with their planning, the Government would expect to give operators a non-binding indicative 
price at an earlier date than when the Government would be willing to provide them with a final fixed 
unit price.’ 
This makes it clear that once the plant is ready to be built, the companies’ contribution to the 
decommissioning fund would be capped and if costs increased beyond the level covered by the 
risk premium, taxpayers would have to foot the bill. Given the very rapid rate of escalation of 
decommissioning cost estimates, in advance of the most challenging stage of decommissioning 
work actually being attempted, there must be a very large risk that the estimated cost will fall far 
short of the actual cost, even if the risk premium is included. This therefore represents a major 
taxpayer-funded cost guarantee. 
                                       
13 Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2008) ‘Consultation on Funded 
Decommissioning Programme Guidance for New Nuclear Power Stations’, BERR. 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file44486.pdf  
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2.2 Waste disposal 
On waste disposal, the cost guarantees are much clearer. For low-level waste, no guarantees are 
involved. Operators will be expected to make their own arrangements for waste disposal and ‘will 
be required to meet these costs from operational expenditure for operational low level waste, and 
from the Fund for decommissioning low level waste’ (Consultation, p 15). While the cost of low-
level waste disposal is far from stable, the process is technically well-established. 
However, intermediate and high-level (spent fuel) waste is subject of a major cost guarantee 
backed by tax-payers (it is assumed that spent fuel will not be reprocessed). The consultation 
states (Consultation, p 104): 
‘The Government would expect to set a fixed unit price based on the operator’s projected full share of 
waste disposal costs at the time when the approvals for the station are given, prior to construction of the 
station.’ 
Given that neither intermediate nor high-level waste disposal is established anywhere, the costs of 
such processes must be regarded as highly speculative. The government does try to provide 
evidence that the risk of cost escalation will be taken account of (Consultation, p 16): 
‘In return for giving operators certainty over when they will transfer title to and liability for their waste 
and spent fuel to the Government, we will set the level of the risk premium to take account of the risk to 
the Government that the construction of disposal facilities is not complete by the date or dates specified 
in the agreed schedule. This risk premium will be built into the fixed unit price for the waste disposal 
service.’ 
However, as with decommissioning, such untried, technically challenging and socially 
contentious processes must involve a huge degree of uncertainty. 
3. Why is nuclear power economically risky & does 
this matter? 
3.1 Who bears the risk? 
Any investment in a large new power station is economically risky because of the scale of the 
investment, the technologically challenging nature of power production and the scope to choose 
options that turn out, for example because of movements in fossil fuel prices, to prove 
uneconomic. These risks were borne by consumers under the old model of organisation of the 
electricity industry where electricity generation was a monopoly in a given territory. If the cost of 
a power plant was higher than forecast or it proved more expensive than the alternatives, the 
additional costs were paid by consumers. While this did expose consumers to investment risk, 
consumers were compensated because the cost of capital for new power stations was low because 
financiers could rely on the generation company recovering any costs it incurred from consumers. 
One exception to this was the USA where regulators could force generation companies to absorb 
some or all of the cost of investments if the regulator judged that the costs were excessive. In 
practice, this provision was not used until the mid-70s. Then, as nuclear plants began to come on 
line at prices far above their cost estimates, regulators began to ‘disallow’ recovery of costs which 
they judged imprudent. Ordering nuclear power plants became a major economic risk for electric 
utilities in the USA and ordering ceased in 1979 with all plants ordered after 1974 subsequently 
cancelled. Dozens of nuclear orders were cancelled to avoid exposure of utilities to this risk. 
Developments elsewhere in shifting investment risk from electricity consumers were not till the 
1990s. One of the main motivations for the trend to reform and liberalise electricity industries 
was a desire to expose electricity generation companies more to investment risk with the 
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expectation that this would act as a financial discipline. If the company made a bad decision, the 
cost would be paid for from the profits of the company, not by consumers. 
3.2 Why is nuclear power particularly economically risky? 
As argued above, any investment in a substantial power plant is a significant economic risk and if 
the company building the plant bears the consequences of that risk, the cost of capital will be 
much higher than under the old system. Financiers will fear that companies building new power 
plants could go bankrupt if the power plant cannot compete in the wholesale electricity market 
and will charge a substantial risk premium on loans to build the plant to cover the risk that the 
loan will not be repaid if the company fails. Nuclear power is amongst the most capital intensive 
of power generation technologies with financial charges expected to account for more than half 
the total kWh cost of generation. So making the electricity generation business a competitive one 
will inevitably disadvantage nuclear power compared to other less capital-intensive technologies. 
However, nuclear power plants are far more economically risky than other types of power plant. 
This risk arises from a number of sources: 
 Nuclear power plants are far more complex than most power plants and there is far more 
scope for errors to be made in construction; 
 Nuclear power plants are mostly constructed on-site, whereas other types of power plant 
can be assembled mainly in factories where costs and quality are easier to control; 
 Many of the costs arising from nuclear generation are out of the control of the companies, 
for example, projected costs for waste disposal and decommissioning have escalated 
sharply in the past couple of decades, whilst safety regulators may impose additional 
requirements on the company as a result of problems arising in other countries. For 
example, the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents led to new regulatory 
requirements being imposed on plants where no problems had occurred. 
However, the main perception of risk arises from the very poor record of the nuclear industry in 
meeting its forecasts. 
3.3 Who are the interested parties & what are their 
motivations? 
In a decision to order a nuclear power plant, there are three sets of interests directly involved, the 
commercial companies selling and buying the plant, the governments and the financial 
community, including financiers, credit rating agencies and investment analysts. Each of these 
has a rather different perspective on the issue. 
3.3.1 The companies 
The duty of a commercial company is to maximise the profits for its shareholders. In a perfect 
market, profits will be maximised by choosing the cheapest production technologies and 
maximising internal efficiency. But perfect markets do not exist and companies rely heavily on 
making strategic decisions for example to reduce their exposure to risk, or build their reputation 
or build customer loyalty. Commercial companies discount future costs and benefits, so their 
outlook tends to be rather short-term and financial consequences more than, say, 20 years in the 
future carry little weight. For plant vendors, some sales may have a particular value if, for 
example, they demonstrate a technology or open up a valuable new market. Companies may 
accept lower profits or even make a loss on a particular order if, in the long term, it strengthens 
the company’s position. Generation companies will, all things being equal, look for the lowest 
cost technology if they are operating in a competitive market. However, if a technology needs 
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protection from the market, it might be very attractive to a company if government is prepared to 
provide that protection, for example, if the technology has particular environmental advantages. 
3.3.2 Government 
Governments have a number of perspectives. They have a strategic duty to increase the 
competitiveness of the country’s economy. Approaches vary widely on this from the 
interventionist approach where they become involved in commercial deals to the ‘hands-off’ free 
market approach. Some governments see nuclear power as providing a cheap or at least a stably 
price source of power that can largely be regarded as indigenous and they therefore see it as their 
duty to promote nuclear power. We will not debate here whether these perceptions are valid, but 
most people would regard it as part of the government’s responsibility to at least steer energy 
policy in a strategic direction. Even the most free-market of governments, such as those of 
Thatcher and Reagan have tried to promote nuclear power. 
Governments of the home country of nuclear vendors may also try to promote reactor sales, for 
example, by providing loan guarantees or by making enabling political deals. The French 
government provided loan guarantees for the Olkiluoto order to promote the interests of the 
French vendor, Areva. The USA has recently concluded a bilateral agreement with India to allow 
US companies to supply reactors and reactor technology to India. This breaks an international 
embargo on supply of reactor technology and equipment going back more than 30 years because 
of India’s nuclear weapons test in 1974. 
3.3.3 The financial community 
In the past, while electricity was a monopoly industry, the financial community had a limited role 
in nuclear power investment decisions, at least for developed countries with stable economies. 
Full cost recovery from consumers was guaranteed so the commercial risk attached to a nuclear 
power plant order was minimal. However, as was demonstrated by the collapse in 2002 of British 
Energy, owning and operating nuclear power plants is now highly risky and that risk is borne at 
least in part by the shareholders. Credit rating agencies will examine the investments and 
decisions of a company and use that to assess their credit rating, which will in turn affect the cost 
of capital to that company. Financiers will assess the riskiness of a project and on that basis, as 
well as the general credit rating of the company, decide whether to lend money and at what rate. 
Investment analysts will look at the decisions of the companies assessing the likely profitability 
of the company. On that basis they will decide whether to buy or sell shares or recommend 
whether to buy or sell. Institutional investors have the power to force management changes if they 
are unhappy with the decisions being taken. 
The decision to order a nuclear power is often seen as a two way deal between the vendor and the 
utility, but the reality is that the third party to the deal is the financial community. If ordering a 
nuclear plant would adversely affect a company’s share price or its credit rating, the company 
would have to think very hard before placing that order. The situation was summed up very 
neatly by the Thomas Capps, CEO of a US utility (Dominion) linked with a bid to build a nuclear 
plant under Nuclear 2010 initiative:
14
 
‘We aren't going to build a nuclear plant anytime soon. Standard & Poor's and Moody's would have a 
heart attack. And my chief financial officer would, too.’ 
                                       
14 M Wald (2005) ‘Interest in Reactors Builds, But Industry Is Still Cautious’ New York Times, April 30, 
2005, p 19. 
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3.4 What are the risks? 
3.4.1 Construction cost and time 
The usual rule-of-thumb for nuclear power is that about two thirds of the generation cost is 
accounted for by fixed costs, that is, costs that will be incurred whether or not the plant is 
operated, and the rest by running costs. The main fixed costs are the cost of paying interest on the 
loans and repaying the capital, but the decommissioning cost is also included. In the United 
States, an assessment of 75 of the country’s reactors showed predicted construction costs to have 
been US$45 billion but the actual costs were US$145 billion.
15
 In India, the country with the 
most recent and current construction experience, completion costs of the last 10 reactors have 
averaged at least 300 per cent over budget.
16
 
Over-runs in construction time also have high economic consequences. A delay in completing the 
plant will increase the interest that has to be paid on the loans needed to finance the plant. If the 
output of the plant is contracted to a customer, the plant owner might have to pay expensive 
compensation to the customer. The market value of a day’s output of a 1000MW nuclear power 
plant could be around US$1.5m so a year’s delay could mean that US$0.5bn of power could have 
to be bought from the market. If supply is tight, the cost of buying this extra replacement power 
could be significantly more than the contract price. 
3.4.2 Operating performance 
For a capital intensive technology like nuclear power, high utilisation is great importance, so that 
the large fixed costs (repaying capital, paying interest and paying for decommissioning) can be 
spread over as many saleable units of output as possible. In addition, nuclear power plants are 
physically inflexible and it would not be wise to start up and shut down the plant or vary the 
output level more than is necessary. As a result, nuclear power plants are operated on ‘base-load’ 
except in the very few countries (e.g., France) where the nuclear capacity represents such a high 
proportion of overall generating capacity that this is not possible. Even in France, the amount of 
load-following is small. A good measure of the reliability of the plant and how effective it is at 
producing saleable output is the capacity factor. The capacity factor is calculated as the output in 
a given period of time expressed as a percentage of the output that would have been produced if 
the unit had operated uninterrupted at its full design output level throughout the period 
concerned.
17
 
Capacity factors of operating plant have been much poorer than forecast. The assumption by 
vendors and those promoting the technology has been that nuclear plants would be extremely 
reliable with the only interruptions to service being for maintenance and refuelling giving 
capacity factors of 85-95 per cent. However, performance was poor and around 1980, the average 
capacity factor for all plants worldwide was about 60 per cent. To illustrate the impact on the 
economics of nuclear power, if we assume fixed costs represent two thirds of the overall cost of 
power if the capacity factor is 90 per cent, the overall cost would go up by a third if capacity 
factor was only 60 per cent. To the extent that poor capacity factors are caused by equipment 
                                       
15 Department of Energy (1986) ‘An analysis of nuclear power construction costs’ Energy Information 
Administration, DOE/EIA-0411. 
16 M.V.Ramana, Antonette D’Sa, Amulsa K.N.Reddy, (2005) ‘Economics of nuclear power from heavy 
water reactors’ Economics and Political Weekly, April 2005. 
17 Note that where reactors are derated, some organisations (e.g., the IAEA) quote the capacity factor on the 
authorised output level rather than the design level. While this may give some useful information on the 
reliability of the plant, for economic analysis purposes, the design rating should be used because that is 
what the purchaser paid to receive. 
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failures, the additional cost of maintenance and repair resulting would further increase the unit 
cost of power. In a competitive market, a nuclear generator contracted to supply power that is 
unable to fulfil its commitment is likely to have to buy the ‘replacement’ power for its customer, 
potentially at very high prices. 
However, from the late 1980s onwards, the nuclear industry worldwide has made strenuous 
efforts to improve performance and worldwide, capacity factors now average more than 80 per 
cent and, for example, the USA now has an average of nearly 90 per cent compared to less than 
60 per cent in 1980, although the average lifetime capacity factor of America’s nuclear power 
plants is still only 70 per cent. 
3.4.3 Operating costs 
Many people assume that nuclear power plants are essentially automatic machines requiring only 
the purchase of fuel and have very low running costs. The cost of fuel is relatively low and has 
been reasonably predictable. However, the assumption of low running costs was proved wrong in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s when a small number of US nuclear power plants were retired 
because the cost of operating them (excluding repaying the fixed costs) was found to be greater 
than cost of building and operating a replacement gas-fired plant. It emerged that non-fuel O&M 
costs were on average in excess of US$22/MWh while fuel costs were then more than 
US$12/MWh.
18
 Strenuous efforts were made to reduce non-fuel nuclear O&M costs and by the 
mid 1990s, average non-fuel O&M costs had fallen to about $12.5/MWh and fuel costs to 
$4.5/MWh. However, it is important to note that these cost reductions were achieved mainly by 
improving the reliability of the plants rather than actually reducing costs. Many O&M costs are 
largely fixed – the cost of employing the staff and maintaining the plant – and vary little 
according to the level of output of the plant so the more power that is produced, the lower the 
O&M cost per MWh. The threat of early closure on grounds of economics has now generally 
been lifted in the USA. 
It is also worth noting that British Energy, which was essentially given its eight nuclear power 
plants when it was created in 1996, collapsed financially in 2002 because income from operation 
of the plants barely covered operating costs. 
Fuel costs have fallen as the world uranium price has been low since the mid-1970s. US fuel costs 
average about US$5/MWh but these are arguably artificially low because the US government 
assumes responsibility for disposal of spent fuel in return for a flat fee of $1/MWh. This is an 
arbitrary price set more than two decades ago and is not based on actual experience. 
3.4.4 Decommissioning and waste disposal costs 
These are difficult to estimate because there is little experience with decommissioning 
commercial-scale plants and the cost of disposal of waste (especially intermediate or long-lived 
waste) is uncertain. However, even schemes which provide a very high level of assurance that 
funds will be available when needed will not make a major difference to the overall economics. 
For example, if the owner was required to place the (discounted) sum forecast to be needed to 
carry out decommissioning at the start of the life of the plant, this would add only about 10 per 
cent to the construction cost. 
The problems come if the cost has been initially underestimated, the funds are lost or the 
company collapses before the plant completes its expected life-time. All of these problems have 
been suffered in Britain. The expected decommissioning cost has gone up several-fold in real 
terms over the past couple of decades. In 1990, when the CEGB was privatised, the accounting 
                                       
18 For statistics on O&M costs, see http://www.nei.org/index.asp?catnum=2&catid=95  
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provisions made from contributions by consumers were not passed on to the successor company, 
Nuclear Electric. The subsidy that applied from 1990-96, described by Michael Heseltine
19
 as 
being to ‘decommission old, unsafe nuclear plants’ was in fact spent as cash flow by the company 
owning the plant and the unspent portion has now been absorbed by the Treasury. The collapse of 
British Energy has meant that a significant proportion of their decommissioning costs will be paid 
by future taxpayers.
20
 
3.4.5 Insurance and liability 
There are two international legal instruments contributing to an international regime on nuclear 
liability: The International Atomic Energy Agency on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963 
and the OECD’s Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, from 
1960 and the linked Brussels Supplementary Convention of 1963. These conventions are linked 
by the Joint Protocol, adopted in 1988. The main purposes of the conventions are to: 
1. Limit liability to a certain amount and limit the period for making claims; 
2. Require insurance or other surety by operators; 
3. Channel liability exclusively to the operator of the nuclear installation; 
4. Impose strict liability on the nuclear operator, regardless of fault, but subject to 
exceptions (sometimes incorrectly referred to as absolute liability); and  
5. Grant exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of one country, normally the country in whose 
territory the incident occurs. 
In 1997 a Protocol was adopted to amend the Vienna Convention, which entered into force in 
2003 and in 2004 a Protocol was adopted on the Paris Conventions. These both changed the 
definition of nuclear damage and changed the scope. For the Brussels Convention new limits of 
liability were set as follows: Operators (insured) €700m; Installation State (public funds) €500m; 
and Collective state contribution €300m; a total liability of €1500m. These new limits have to be 
ratified by all contracting parties and are currently not in force. 
The scale of the costs caused by, for example, the Chernobyl disaster, which may be in the order 
of hundreds of billions of euro, means that conventional insurance cover would probably not be 
available and even if it was, its cover might not be credible because a major accident would 
bankrupt the insurance companies. 
It has been estimated that if Electricité de France (EDF), the main French electric utility, was 
required to fully insure its power plants with private insurance but using the current 
internationally agreed limit on liabilities of approximately €420m, it would increase EDF’s 
insurance premiums from €0.017/MWh, to €0.19/MWh, thus adding around 8 per cent to the cost 
of generation. However, if there was no ceiling in place and an operator had to cover the full cost 
of a worst-case scenario accident, it would increase the insurance premiums to €5/MWh, thus 
increasing the cost of generation by around 300 per cent
21
.  
                                       
19 Heseltine M, President of the Board of Trade, Hansard, 19 October 1992. 
20
 Thomas S (2007) ‘Comparison among different decommissioning funds methodologies for nuclear 
installations: Country report United Kingdom’ Report commissioned on behalf of the European 
Commission Directorate-General Energy and Transport, H2 Service Contract TREN/05/NUCL/S07.55436 
21 ‘Solutions for environment, economy and technology’, Report for DG Environment, Environmentally 
harmful support measures in EU Member States, European Commission, January 2003 p 132. 
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4. A short history of the British nuclear power 
programme 
The policy announced by the UK government in January 2008 will be the fifth attempt to re-
launch the UK nuclear power programme. The first generation nuclear power plants in Britain 
were of an indigenous design known as Magnox. Eleven Magnox stations were completed 
between 1956 and 1971, but by the early 1960s, it was clear this design could never be economic. 
The Magnox stations are generally portrayed as reliable workhorses and if they had been 
followed by successful new designs, they would probably have been retired at the end of their 20 
year design life-time. However, the failure of subsequent programmes has meant that they have 
operated long beyond their design lifetime, for up to 40 years and in 2008, two units remain in 
service. They have suffered corrosion problems, their reliability has been mediocre and they 
represent a very expensive source of electricity. 
In 1965, the UK government chose another British design to succeed the Magnoxes, the 
Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) and five stations, each of about 1200MW, were ordered. 
Instead of the four years forecast, these took from 10-24 years from start of construction to 
commercial operation. None of the plants ever operated as designed and all operate at 
significantly below their design maximum output rating. 
By 1970, the problems with the design were clear and after a further three years of investigations, 
the government chose another UK design, the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR) 
in 1973. By 1977, the developers had to acknowledge that this design could not be built at a 
commercial scale and this design was abandoned. In 1977, the government adopted a dual reactor 
policy, two more AGRs were to be built and the steps taken to be in a position to order a US 
design of reactor, the Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) from Westinghouse. In 1979, the two 
AGR orders were confirmed and the government announced a 10 reactor order programme of 
Westinghouse PWRs with the first order to be placed in 1981, the others to follow at yearly 
intervals. By 1987, when the first order (Sizewell B) was actually placed, the programme had 
been reduced to four units. At the same time, the government announced its intention to privatise 
the UK electricity industry and operate the generation sector as a competitive market. 
In 1989, the government acknowledged that, after two years of effort, a plan could not be devised 
that would allow the privatisation of the nuclear power plants. The main problem appeared to be 
the economic risk associated with building and operating the four new proposed PWRs (including 
Sizewell B). The operating plants were uneconomic but their costs were largely known, and 
subsidies could be used to cover these. However, the risk of over-running construction times and 
costs and poor operating reliability were much more open-ended for the new PWRs. The Energy 
Minister of the time claimed that ‘unprecedented guarantees were being sought.  I am not willing 
to underwrite the private sector in this way…’.22 
Studies preparing for privatisation had revealed that, far from being cheap sources of generation 
as had always been claimed, the operating cost alone of the Magnox and the AGR stations was 
double the expected wholesale price of electricity. The construction cost, normally expected to 
account for more than two thirds of the total generation cost from a nuclear power plant, had to be 
written off. The nuclear power plants were transferred to two new publicly owned companies, 
Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear and a huge consumer subsidy was introduced raising £1bn 
per year simply to allow the companies to break even. The four unit PWR programme was 
abandoned, although work was allowed to continue on Sizewell B despite the clear evidence it 
would be hopelessly uneconomic. 
                                       
22 Wakeham J 1989a. House of Commons Debates. HC Debates, 1988/89, Vol. 159, 9 November 1989. 
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In 1996, a year after the completion of Sizewell B, at a cost in excess of £3bn, when its costs 
were known and it seemed likely that its reliability would be reasonable, the government sold the 
seven AGRs and Sizewell B for about £1.7bn in a new company, British Energy. The reliability 
of the AGRs had improved sufficiently that there appeared a reasonable expectation that their 
running costs could be met from the income from sales of electricity. While the company was 
required to make some contribution to the cost of decommissioning, the largest part of the cost 
was left to be met from British Energy’s cash flow at the time decommissioning was carried out. 
The privatisation meant that eight nuclear stations, each of about 1200MW, paid for by 
consumers, were sold for about half the cost of building Sizewell B. Much of the cost of building 
Sizewell B was paid for from the £1bn per year consumer subsidy that applied from 1990-96, 
money consumers had been told would go to pay for decommissioning and waste disposal. 
The UK wholesale electricity price remained unreasonably high from privatisation in 1990 until 
2001, when it fell sharply. British Energy quickly got into difficulties and by September 2002, it 
had collapsed. The government eventually managed to force through a package of measures to 
save the company by assuming some of its liabilities and subsidising its costs (for example on 
reprocessing) and the company was re-launched in 2005 with the government taking 64 per cent 
share of ownership as the price for saving the company. In June 2007, the government sold 25 per 
cent of the shares and it expects to sell a further 10 per cent, leaving the government with a 30 per 
cent stake. When the wholesale price of electricity falls again, the reliability of the plants 
deteriorates as they age and as the impact of having to retire the oldest AGRs takes effect, it 
seems likely that the company will fail with taxpayers again having to take on the financial 
burdens it leaves behind. 
Ironically, the main asset the company now has is ownership of the sites where many of the 
existing plants are. It is generally acknowledged that in any new nuclear programme in the UK, 
the first plants will be built on existing sites as it might be expected that public opposition here 
would be much less than at new sites. British Energy has neither the resources nor the credibility 
to build new nuclear plants, but it could earn significant income from use of its sites and a new 
nuclear programme may be British Energy’s best hope of survival, albeit essentially as a real 
estate company. 
4.1 Lessons 
Even when the evidence is overwhelming that mistakes have been made, as happened with the 
AGR programme, the SGHWR and Sizewell B, government will not abandon misconceived 
programmes until long after they should have been cut and at great cost to taxpayers and 
electricity consumers. The failed attempts to re-launch nuclear power programmes were based on 
hopelessly optimistic forecasts of construction costs and times, reliability and operating cost. 
However, the main outcome of this experience is the huge opportunity cost of these largely 
fruitless programmes. They consumed the vast majority of government and electricity industry 
R&D budgets, they dominated the attention of civil servants involved with the electricity industry 
and they influenced UK industry to try to develop nuclear capabilities instead of more productive 
and profitable capabilities in renewable energy sources and energy efficient technologies. 
5. Olkiluoto & the US Nuclear Power 2010 programme 
5.1 Olkiluoto 
The Olkiluoto order is currently the only live new order in Western Europe or North America and 
the first to be placed since the Civaux 2 order in France of 1993 which was coupled to the grid in 
1999. It is the first plant of a new design, the EPR, developed by the Franco-German company, 
 15 
Areva. The EPR is a 1600MW Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) evolved from designs supplied 
by the two main owners of Areva NP, Areva (France) and Siemens (Germany). The customer is a 
company, TVO, owned by the large electric-intensive industries of Finland. 
Olkiluto is often portrayed as the exemplar of the capabilities of current designs. It is predicted to 
be cheaper to build and operate, and safer than its predecessors. It is also seen as a demonstration 
that nuclear power orders are feasible in liberalised electricity markets. Many commentators 
claimed that nuclear power orders were unfeasible in liberalised markets because consumers 
would no longer bear the full risk of building and operating new power plants. It is therefore 
important to examine the circumstances of the Olkiluoto order to see how far it really can be seen 
as a commercial order chosen in a free market and without subsidies and guarantees. 
Before examining the specifics of the order, it is worth noting that Finland’s experience with 
nuclear power has been much better than that of the UK. Finland ordered four relatively small 
nuclear power plants from 1971-75. Two of these at Loviisa (both 440MW net) used the first 
generation Russian design (VVER-440) but were upgraded to Western standards with the 
assistance of Siemens. The two at Olkiluoto (both 660MW net) use a Swedish BWR design 
similar to plants built in Sweden. The reliability of all four plants has been high and even today, 
when reliability is much higher in the rest of the world than it was in the 1980s; all four Finnish 
units are in the top 20 per cent in the league table of nuclear power plants ordered by lifetime 
capacity factor. So the track record of Finland as a nuclear operator is better than that of the UK. 
5.1.1 Construction cost and time 
To reduce the risk to the buyer, Areva offered the plant under turnkey terms
23
: 
‘It is a fixed price contract, with the consortium having total responsibility for plant equipment and 
buildings, construction of the entire plant up to and including commissioning (excluding excavation), 
licensability, schedule and performance. The overall project cost has been estimated by TVO at around 
€3bn.’ 
The turnkey terms fixed the price TVO would have to pay and allowed for fines to be levied on 
the contractors if the plant was late. The schedule allowed for a 48 month period from pouring of 
first concrete to first criticality. 
From the start, the construction period has gone seriously wrong, so that after 18 months of 
construction in December 2006, the plant was 18 months behind schedule and the vendor, Areva, 
was suffering severe losses
24
. This was not the result of a particular problem but the result of a 
range of failures including: welding, delays in detailed designs, problems with concrete and with 
the quality of some equipment. More generally, it seemed that none of the parties involved 
including the vendor, the customer or the safety regulator had a clear enough understanding of the 
requirements building a nuclear plant placed on them. 
In December 2006, the French Ministry of Industry (the French government owns more than 90 
per cent of Areva) said that the losses to Areva had reached €700m on a contract fixed at €3bn. 
The turnkey contract should ensure that this cost escalation is not passed on to the customer 
although the deal appeared to be under strain. Philippe Knoche, an Areva representative stated: 
‘Areva-Siemens cannot accept 100 per cent compensation responsibility, because the project is 
one of vast co-operation. The building site is joint so we absolutely deny 100 per cent 
                                       
23
 ‘Nuclear power progress; site work underway on Finland’s 1,600MWe EPR’ Modern Power Systems, 
March 2004. 
24 For a detailed review of the problems up to March 2007, see Thomas, S, Bradford, P, Froggatt, A, 
Milborrow, D (2007) ‘The economics of nuclear power’, Greenpeace International. 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/the-economics-of-nuclear-power  
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compensation principle.’ TVO did not accept this interpretation and the TVO project manager, 
Martin Landtman, when asked about Knoche’s statement said: ‘I don’t believe that Areva says 
this. The site is in the contractor’s hands at the moment. Of course, in the end, TVO is responsible 
of what happens at the site. But the realisation of the project is Areva’s responsibility.’25 
Compensation for delays has already reached the limit of €300m that would be payable for a 
delay of 18 months. The buyer will not receive compensation for further delays beyond those 
already incurred by September 2006. 
Further problems were announced in August 2007, although these were not fully quantified in 
terms of delays to completion or additional costs. It was reported that the delays were partly due 
to problems meeting the requirement that the plant should be able to withstand an aircraft 
crashing into it and partly because the volume of documentation required had been 
underestimated by the vendor
26
. One report stated that Areva NP was going to take an additional 
provision €500-700m on top of the €700m provision already made for losses27. In December 
2007, Areva announced that the plant was not expected to be completed until summer 2011 
5.1.2 Finance 
The details of how the plant would be financed have not been published, but the European 
Renewable Energies Federation (EREF) and Greenpeace separately made complaints to the 
European Commission in December 2004 that they contravened European State aid regulations. 
The Commission did not begin to investigate the complaints until October 2006 and in September 
2007, the Competition Commission dropped the case. According to EREF, the Bayerische 
Landesbank (owned by the state of Bavaria) led the syndicate (with Handelsbanken, Nordea, 
BNP Paribas and J P Morgan) that provided the majority of the finance. It provided a loan of 
€1.95bn, about 60 per cent of the total cost at an interest rate of 2.6 per cent. It is not clear if this 
is a real or a nominal rate. If it is a nominal rate, the real rate is effectively zero. Two export 
credit institutions are also involved: France’s Coface, with a €610m export credit guarantee 
covering Areva supplies, and the Swedish Export Agency SEK for €110m. 
5.1.3 The customer 
The buyer Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) is an organisation unique to Finland. PVO, the largest 
shareholder holds 60 per cent of TVO’s shares. PVO is a not-for-profit company owned by 
Finnish electric-intensive industry that generates about 15 per cent of Finland’s electricity. Its 
shareholders are entitled to purchase electricity at cost in proportion to the size of their equity 
stakes. In return, they are obliged to pay fixed costs according to the percentage of their stakes 
and variable costs in proportion to the volume of electricity they consume. The other main 
shareholder in TVO is the largest Finnish electricity company, Fortum, with 25 per cent of the 
shares. The majority of shares in Fortum are owned by the Finnish Government. This 
arrangement is effectively a life-of-plant contract for the output of Olkiluoto 3 at prices set to 
fully cover costs. 
                                       
25 Finnish Broadcasting Company TV news, 30 January 2007 
26
 Financial Times, August 11, 2007, p 19 ‘Areva's nuclear delay threatens China contract’ and 
Datamonitor Newswire, August 13, 2007 ‘Areva-Siemens consortium announces delay of Finnish nuclear 
reactor’ 
27 Thompson Financial News, August 13, 2007 ‘Areva to take 500-700 mln eur provisions for new Finnish 
reactor delay - report.’ 
 17 
5.1.4 Analysis of the Olkiluoto experience 
Turnkey contracts have been few and far between in the history of nuclear power and have 
generally resulted in huge losses to the vendor. Nuclear power plants are immensely complex 
requiring a great deal of on-site work and input from a large number of organisations. It is 
therefore difficult for any one company to feel they have sufficient control over the process that 
they can guarantee the price to the customer. The most famous turnkey orders were the 12 placed 
in the USA in 1963-66
28
. The vendors lost huge amounts of money on these orders, but they 
achieved their objective. They convinced utilities that the vendors were confident of their designs 
and that buying a nuclear plant was no greater risk than buying a fossil fuel plant. Subsequent US 
orders did not contain this protection to the buyer. 
If the Olkiluoto order does demonstrate the EPR technology, opening the way for further orders, 
the losses incurred by Areva and Siemens might appear justifiable to their shareholders. 
However, experience has been so poor that, far from convincing new buyers, it might put them 
off and potential buyers of the EPR in India and China are reported to be perturbed by the 
problems
29
. However, it seems unlikely that the owners of Areva could contemplate offering 
turnkey terms again until there is very clear evidence that the probability of cost and time over-
runs for an EPR had become extremely low. 
The unique nature of the plant owner means that, far from competing in an open market, the 
owners have been able to insulate it very fully from the market by contracting for the lifetime’s 
output of the plant at whatever cost is incurred. There is risk to the owners. The plant is likely to 
be at least two years late and the owners will have to buy power from the market for that period, 
potentially at high price. If the cost of power from Olkiluoto proves to be significantly higher 
than the wholesale market price, the owners will have to buy expensive power and for electric-
intensive industry, where the cost of power purchase could make up about half total costs, this 
could be catastrophic. 
The European Commission has found that the finance did not involve unfair state aids. However, 
it is bizarre to find that loans to a prosperous Western European country have to be backed by 
export credit guarantees and the cost of borrowing is blatantly far below commercial rates. The 
Olkiluoto order therefore does not provide any evidence that nuclear orders are feasible in a 
liberalised market without substantial public subsidies and guarantees. Experience so far 
reinforces the very high economic risks of cost and time over-runs involved in the construction of 
a nuclear power plant. 
5.2 The US Nuclear Power 2010 programme 
5.2.1 The Programme 
The Bush administration has made a concerted effort to revive nuclear ordering with its 2002 
Nuclear Power 2010 programme. It has yet to achieve a new order. Under the programme, the US 
Department of Energy (USDOE) expects to launch cooperative projects with industry
30
: 
‘.. to obtain NRC approval of three sites for construction of new nuclear power plants under the Early 
Site Permit (ESP) process, and to develop application preparation guidance for the combined 
Construction and Operating License (COL) and to resolve generic COL regulatory issues. The COL 
process is a ‘one-step’ licensing process by which nuclear plant public health and safety concerns are 
                                       
28 Thomas, S (1988) ‘The realities of nuclear power’, Cambridge University Press 
29 Financial Times, August 11, 2007, p 19 ‘Areva's nuclear delay threatens China contract’ 
30 Department of Energy, ‘Nuclear Power 2010’ www.ne.doe.gov/np2010/neNP2010a.html (viewed 6/3/07) 
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resolved prior to commencement of construction, and NRC approves and issues a license to build and 
operate a new nuclear power plant.’  
A total of up to US$450m in grants is expected to be available for at least three projects. Two 
main organisations emerged initially to take advantage of these subsidies and have signed 
agreements with the USDOE to develop COLs. Nustart, launched in 2004, was the first utility 
grouping to express an interest. It comprises a consortium of eight US utilities including 
Constellation Energy, Entergy, Duke Power, Exelon, Florida Power & Light, Progress Energy, 
Southern Company and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, providing staff time not cash).
31
 
EDF, and the vendors, Westinghouse and GE are members but have no voting rights.  
This was followed up by the nuclear provisions of the US Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 
2005). The Bush programme is best understood as an effort to reverse the power market lessons 
of the 1980s and 1990s. Since investors have proven unwilling to assume the risks of building 
new nuclear units, even after all the improving of designs and streamlining of the licensing 
process, EPACT 2005 reverts to the 1960s and 70s by reassigning risk back to those who are 
given no choice, this time the taxpayers instead of the customers.  
The most important nuclear provisions of EPACT 2005 offered three types of support.
32
 First, a 
limited number of new nuclear power plants can receive a US$18/MWh production tax credit for 
up to US$125m per 1000MW (or about 80 per cent of what the plant could earn if it ran 100 per 
cent of the time). The second benefit is a provision for federal loan guarantees covering up to 80 
per cent of the debt involved in the project (not the total cost). The third benefit provides up to 
US$500m in risk insurance for the first two units and US$250m for units 3-6. This insurance is to 
be paid if delays not the fault of the licensee slow the licensing of the plant
33
. There was also 
support for R&D funding worth US$850m and help with historic decommissioning costs worth 
US$1.3bn. 
By 2007, it was clear that the loan guarantees were not sufficient to reassure financiers. In April 
2007, the US Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the trade body for the nuclear industry in a meeting 
with the US government Office of Management and Budget (OMB) lobbied for 100 per cent debt 
coverage for up to 80 per cent of the project cost. Subsequently, the Department of Energy 
proposed 90 per cent of debt coverage by loan guarantees up to a maximum of 80 per cent of total 
project cost, but this still did not satisfy the nuclear industry, which wanted guarantees for 100 per 
cent of the debt. In August 2007, the US the OMB appeared to allow the Department of Energy 
discretion to guarantee 100 per cent of the debt
34
. In addition, it emerged that a provision in an 
Energy Bill passed by Senate allowed provision for up to US$50bn in loan guarantees for new 
nuclear power plants
35
. If we assume that a nuclear plant would cost US$4bn and that guarantees 
would apply up to the maximum 80 per cent of project cost allowed, this would provide 
guarantees for at least 15 units. 
                                       
31 In December 2007, Constellation withdrew to pursue its own technology choice and were replaced by 
DTE Energy. 
32 Parker L & Holt M (2007) ‘Nuclear Power: Outlook for New U.S. Reactors’ CRS Report for Congress, 
Order Code RL33442. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33442.pdf  
33
 All three measures require implementing regulations, and the loan guarantees require an appropriation. 
So the actual scope and benefit of the subsidy is unclear. 
34 EnergyWashington Week, August 1, 2007 ‘DOE Loan Proposal Seen As Likely Failure By Industry, 
Wall Street’ 
35 International Herald Tribune, August 1, 2007, p 1 ‘Senate bill could help finance nuclear plants’ 
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5.2.2 Analysis of the programme 
The publicly-stated basis for the Finnish and UK nuclear programmes was that nuclear orders did 
not need subsidies and guarantees, albeit the reality was very different for Finland. However, the 
basis of the US programme was that subsidies and guarantees for about four projects would be 
enough to kick-start ordering. The changes in 2007 to the provisions mean that the support is 
much more extensive and open-ended than originally planned. 
The provisions in Finland and USA provide a good indicator of where UK companies wanting to 
build nuclear power plants will look for support. The largest elements are the loan guarantees and 
the market support. Comprehensive guarantees for the loans are vital because, as with Olkiluoto, 
this will dramatically reduce the cost of capital by shifting risk to taxpayers. Especially in regions 
where some form of wholesale electricity market exists some form of price guarantee is necessary 
so that the nuclear plant is not exposed to the uncertainties of a market. The provisions on 
insuring against regulatory delays are also important but their cost is significantly less. 
Loan guarantees and regulatory insurance lower the price of nuclear power without lowering its 
cost, at least not for many years. This reduction occurs because some of the costs and risks are 
moved out of the price charged to customers and onto the shoulders of taxpayers. For example, 
the production tax credit deprives the US Treasury of funds that must be made up from other 
sources. Whether the benefit flows through to customers or is retained by investors will vary with 
the economic regulatory approach used, but either way prices can be kept lower than would be 
the case if the credit did not exist. Similarly, the loan guarantees assure lenders that they will be 
repaid no matter what happens at the power plant. Essentially, their guaranteed loans are 
converted into government obligations. This lowers both the interest rate and the amount of more 
expensive equity capital that must be raised, as was the case for Olkiluoto in Finland. 
Taken together and combined with other benefits recently conferred on the industry in the United 
States (such as the 20 year extension of the law limiting nuclear power plant exposure to liability 
for the costs of a serious accident), the benefits in the recent U.S law have substantially increased 
the likelihood of a new US nuclear power plant order in the next few years. Indeed, the incentives 
are structured to provide maximum benefit to plants ordered before the end of 2008.  
At a recent conference, three US electric utility CEOs made clear that without the 2005 
Congressional action there was no possibility of nuclear orders, but even the extensive support 
now envisaged might not be sufficient to ensure new nuclear orders
36
:  
[TXU CEO John Wilder] said there were now projects totalling about 26 gigawatts lining up for limited 
federal incentives, which could provide ‘anywhere from a US$2 per megawatt-hour advantage to a 
US$20 per megawatt-hour advantage.’ He said he didn’t believe it would be known which companies 
would receive those benefits until about 2012. ‘Quite frankly, that’s all the difference between these 
projects working or not working,’ he said. 
NRG Energy President/CEO David Crane, also speaking on a September 26 conference panel with 
Wilder, said the measures in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 were key to his company’s decision to 
pursue potential construction at South Texas Project. ‘I do think those are absolutely necessary to get 
nuclear plants under way,’ he said. ‘In fact, until I actually knew what they were, we would not have 
even contemplated it.’ 
Exelon Nuclear’s [President Christopher] Crane said that the incentives were a key factor in his 
company’s decision to prepare a COL. But other factors would influence whether Exelon commits to 
building a new reactor. 
                                       
36 ‘Merrill Lynch global power and gas leaders conference’ Nucleonics Week, 5 October 2006 
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6. Can use of financial instruments overcome the 
problem of risk? 
Some commentators have suggested that the issues of economic risk can be dealt with by 
innovative use of insurance and financial instruments. Newbery
37
 claimed that, using these, 
nuclear power plants could be built in the UK without use of government subsidies or other forms 
of government support. 
Newbery’s claim was based on the assumption that the main risk was market risk. Specifically 
identified three risks: with large amounts of intermittent renewables being built, at windy times, 
the energy spot price would occasionally crash; the carbon price, set in the European Union 
Energy Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was uncertain; and, in the future, the spot price of gas, which 
has a close relationship with the spot electricity price, was likely to be much less stable than it has 
been due to geo-political reasons. 
Newbery proposed to deal with this risk by issuing bonds to small consumers so that the amount 
they paid for a specified amount of electricity was fixed. He gives an example under which, a 
consumer would buy a bond for £9 to buy 100kWh of electricity. If the retail price is higher than 
this, consumers would receive a larger dividend and if it was lower, the dividend would also be 
lower, but consumers would have lower electricity bills. Given that a large proportion of small 
consumers do not understand how to switch electricity supplier, much less understand the details 
of financial bonds, it seems highly unlikely consumers would see it as worthwhile to buy these 
bonds. 
However, the main problem with Newbery’s proposal is that he does not understand where the 
main issue of economic risk with nuclear power plants lies. Newbery says ‘suppose that 
construction, operating and regulatory risk can be insured, leaving only market price risk’. Why 
does Newbery assume that it will be cheaper to cover this risk through insurance rather than for it 
to be reflected in a high cost of capital? Insurers have access to the same information as financiers 
and there is no reason to assume they will assess the risk differently. 
Newbery assumes any additional costs from the regulatory risk would be guaranteed by 
government (taxpayers). This would be a subsidy and probably a rather large one. However, this 
figure is dwarfed by the risks arising from construction and operation. The Finnish nuclear power 
plant now under construction, Olkiluoto, which was supposed to be the show-case for new 
nuclear technologies, is now 60 per cent over budget (€1.5bn) and two and a half years late, with 
ample scope for further cost and time overruns. If we assume the value of the output of a nuclear 
plant is €50/MWh, then the annual value of the output of a plant like Olkiluoto would be about 
€600m if it was reliable (achieving 90% of its maximum feasible output over the year). A nuclear 
company that cannot fulfil its contracts because the plant is late being completed will have to buy 
replacement power from the market at the highest prices on offer. The delay of 2.5 years would 
result in losses of at least €1.5bn from the energy not produced. An insurer that had covered 
Olkiluoto would therefore have to pay out €3bn for cost and time over-runs. What level of 
premium would be needed for an insurer to be willing to cover such a risk? 
However, once the plant is complete, the technical risk does not end. Nuclear plants are not 
always reliable and if we look at the four most recently completed plants in France, in their first 
four years of operation, they averaged an availability of 45%. So if an insurer had insured these 
plants to operate at 90% availability, they would have had to pay out somewhere in the order of 
€4bn if we assume the replacement power could be bought at only average market price. 
                                       
37 Newbery D (2008) ‘Reduce the risk of nuclear investment’ Financial Times, January 9, 2008, p 15. 
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The reality is that using financial instruments cannot make risk disappear. Ultimately, the cost of 
bearing that risk has to be paid for and in this case, it will be the public that pays for it, either 
taxpayers or electricity consumers. 
7. A UK programme 
7.1 Corporate strategies 
On the basis of experience in Finland and USA, it seems implausible that a nuclear power 
programme can be launched in Britain without the support of public subsidies and guarantees. 
British Energy’s financial collapse of 2002 probably means it is not plausible for it to pursue an 
application to build new nuclear power stations independently, although the sites it owns mean 
that anyone hoping to build new nuclear capacity in the UK will probably have to involve British 
Energy. All of the six main UK electricity companies have expressed interest in participating in 
plans to build new nuclear plants. EDF is usually seen as the most aggressive advocate of new 
nuclear capacity and has plans to build at least four new nuclear power plants (of the EPR design) 
in the UK. E.ON, also an experienced nuclear operator is also potentially an owner-operator, but 
has not yet specified the extent of its ambitions. RWE, like E.ON, a German based company with 
significant nuclear experience has also stated its intention to invest in new nuclear capacity as an 
owner-operator. Centrica has said that it hopes to invest more than £3bn (equivalent to one new 
units) in new nuclear capacity in collaboration with other companies.
38
 Scottish Power has not 
made a strong commitment to participating in new nuclear build, but Iberdrola, its Spanish owner 
was reported to be in talks with British Energy in January about building a 1600MW plant in the 
UK. In January 2008, EDF acknowledged that it was considering launching a takeover bid for 
Iberdrola and hence Scottish Power. Scottish and Southern Energy has also held talks with British 
Energy about participating in new nuclear capacity. 
This apparently united front in favour of nuclear seems hard to explain given the implausibility of 
orders without subsidy and the government’s apparently firm commitment not to provide 
subsidies and guarantees. However, while the companies are unwilling to use the words subsidies 
and guarantees, this appears to be due to a rather questionable view of what represents a subsidy 
or guarantee. For example, even the most aggressive of UK nuclear utilities, EDF, emphasised the 
need for some support: Plants could be built without subsidy ‘provided that there was agreement 
on the funding of decommissioning and waste disposal, a clear licensing and consent road map, 
and a credible carbon price.’ 
Unless the UK government is very naïve about the attractiveness of nuclear investment, or it does 
actually expect any nuclear orders to be placed, there must be suspicions that the government and 
the companies are indulging in semantic distinctions about what constitutes a guarantee or a 
subsidy. Government expects it will take seven years to pilot one or more designs through the 
expensive and time-consuming process of obtaining safety approval. This will be a major 
challenge for the nuclear safety body, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), which is 
already understaffed and struggling to replace its aging workforce. There must be strong 
suspicions that if after this effort, no orders are forthcoming, the government of the day, by then 
with significant distance from today’s government, will be tempted to introduce guarantees and 
subsidies. This will avoid the embarrassment of a UK government yet again diverting resources 
away from other energy options to a fruitless nuclear programme. 
On the face of it, utilities would seem to have no interest in building uneconomic facilities. 
However, for such utilities, nuclear orders would only be placed if there were clear provisions 
                                       
38 The Express ‘Centrica to invest GBP 3bn in nuclear’, Feb 22, 2008. 
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taking the plant out of the market. So the more nuclear capacity a company owned, the less 
exposed to the market it would be. Companies cannot be held to statements by today’s executives 
so playing along with the government today simply puts them at the head of the queue for any 
subsidies that are made available. If the subsidies do not materialise or they are inadequate, the 
company can simply step out of the queue at no cost. 
7.2 Subsidies and guarantees 
Experience from Finland and the USA shows where these might be required. 
7.2.1 Decommissioning and waste disposal cost 
As argued above, if decommissioning and waste disposal costs are accurately estimated from the 
start of operation, the delay from close of plant to completion of decommissioning and waste 
disposal is accurately forecast, provisions are invested securely and the rate of return the 
provisions can make is also accurately estimated, making provisions for decommissioning and 
waste disposal should not have a major impact on nuclear economics. Decommissioning and 
waste disposal take place so far in the future, the cost is effectively ‘discounted’ away. However, 
if during the life of the plant, it emerges that the decommissioning and waste disposal costs have 
been underestimated, the provisions are lost or the return is less than expected, making up the 
additional money could be a major burden to the owner. Given the limited experience of 
decommissioning and waste disposal, and the rapid rise in decommissioning estimates, 
companies are likely, as noted by Vincent de Rivaz, to seek some cap on the contribution they 
have to make to pay for decommissioning and waste disposal. 
The UK government quickly acceded to this pressure and in a consultation published in February 
2008, is offering to guarantee owners of nuclear power plants a fixed cost for decommissioning 
and waste disposal (intermediate- and high-level). However, the government is still claiming 
that subsidies and guarantees are not being offered
39
: 
‘The Energy Bill and the guidance published today make clear that companies are liable by law to meet 
their full costs. "Let me be clear - full means full. Funds will be sufficient, secure and independent, it 
will be a criminal offence not to comply with the approved arrangements and we are taking powers to 
guard against unforeseen shortfalls."’ 
It is not clear that such guarantees would have been needed given that such comprehensive 
guarantees were not required in Finland and are not being discussed in the USA. Clearly, the 
companies will gratefully accept any additional guarantees they are offered but given how far 
away these costs are, it seems unlikely that financiers would see them as a major risk. 
In the USA, the government has taken title to spent fuel since 1982 and levies a fixed charge on 
utilities of only 0.1c/kWh for disposal of spent fuel. There is no ‘intermediate-level’ category in 
the USA and all waste that is not high-level is categorised as low-level. No cost guarantees exist 
for low-level waste in the USA. 
Decommissioning funds are also not generally guaranteed in the USA. Costs estimates must be 
continually updated and if a shortfall is anticipated, either because costs have escalated or the 
fund has not earned as much interest as expected, contributions may have to be increased. 
                                       
39 BERR (2008) Press release: ‘Clean up fund is precondition for new nuclear – Hutton’, Feb 22, 2008. 
http://www.gnn.gov.uk/environment/fullDetail.asp?ReleaseID=354629&NewsAreaID=2&NavigatedFrom
Department=True  
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7.2.2 Construction costs and loan guarantees 
The key to the Finnish order was the availability of a ‘turnkey’ contract that seemed to place the 
risk of cost and time over-runs on the vendor rather than the buyer. The UK would be a 
prestigious prize for any nuclear vendor but at present it seems highly unlikely that any vendor 
could take the risk of offering any more than one unit on turnkey terms and probably then only if 
subsequent orders were committed and on less stringent terms to the vendor. Both the US and 
Finnish programmes have been based on loan guarantees paid for by the public, albeit in the 
Finnish case, the French and Swedish public. In addition, in some US states, wholesale 
competition is being reined in and nuclear plants may be built under the traditional model of 
making them part of a ‘regulated rate base’. Under this, the company owning the plant would be 
guaranteed a fair rate of return on its investment. Publicly funded loan guarantees would appear 
to be essential if loans are to be offered at reasonable rates of interest unless nuclear plants are 
completely removed from the market. 
7.2.3 Market guarantees 
For the US programme, huge production tax credits are being offered that mean there is a high 
chance costs will be covered. For Olkiluoto, the plant’s output is covered by an effective life-of-
plant power purchase agreement at full cost recovery terms. Market guarantees would be likely to 
violate European Union unfair state aids legislation so some creative thinking, perhaps through a 
high, guaranteed carbon price might be used to effectively provide support. 
7.2.4 Operating costs and reliability 
The Finnish nuclear industry has always had a good record of reliably operating nuclear power 
plants and the US industry has turned round a very poor record of reliability in the past 15 years 
so that US plants are now amongst the most reliable in the world. So both countries have a good 
track record of operation. However, while the UK nuclear industry has improved its performance 
since 1990, the reliability of its plants is probably worse than that of any other developed country. 
Whether investors would assume that the poor British record was not relevant given that the 
operating companies would probably be French or German remains to be seen. No vendor would 
guarantee the operating cost of a plant it sold, nor would insurance cover be available so this is a 
risk it would be hard to cover. 
7.2.5 Regulatory delays 
The Finnish regulator has been blamed, not necessarily justifiably, for some of the delays at 
Olkiluoto and the US programme offers some insurance cover against delays resulting from the 
regulatory process. Cover might therefore be needed for an UK plants, as envisaged by the EDF 
UK CEO, Vincent de Rivaz. 
7.2.6 Other issues 
There are a number of other costs attached to building any new power plant that could be the 
subject of requests for subsidy. These include: 
 Cost of connection to the transmission network. Particularly if the plant is built on a new 
site, or it replaces a much smaller unit, there could be significant transmission 
reinforcement costs. National Grid Transco estimated that if all existing nuclear power 
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stations were to be replaced, the cost of reinforcements to the transmission network 
would be £1.4bn
40
 
 Spinning reserve costs. New nuclear power plants, especially if the EPR was chosen 
would represent the largest units in the system, up to 1700MW. ‘Spinning reserve’ is the 
amount of plant that must be kept in readiness for operation in case of the failure of the 
largest unit. PB Power noted that the current UK system is designed to allow the failure 
of two 660MW units. This was a standard derived in the 1970s when 660MW units were 
the largest units on the UK system. PB Power estimated that if an EPR was built with 
output of 1580MW, an additional 260MW of spinning reserve would be needed at a cost, 
if supplied by a gas-fired plant of £1.3/MWh or £2.1/MWh if supplied by a coal-fired 
plant. The EPR design is now likely to have a rating of about 1700MW so this cost may 
be an underestimate if 400MW of additional spinning reserve was needed. Of the other 
potential designs, the AP-1000 and the ACR-1000 would not need additional spinning 
reserve while the ESBWR (1520MW) would require about 200MW additional reserve. 
8. Conclusions 
Politically, it seems that subsidies and guarantees are anathema to a significant proportion of 
Members of Parliament so if a new nuclear programme is to go ahead in the UK, it has to at least 
have the appearance of not involving subsidies and guarantees. At the time of writing, the British 
political climate is particularly sensitised to the risks involved in public guarantees. The result of 
the government’s decision in 2007 to guarantee a failing bank, Northern Rock, has ultimately 
exposed it to liabilities of up to £100bn. 
Looking further back, the failure to put in place adequate measures to ensure that 
decommissioning of publicly-owned civil nuclear facilities has led to the Treasury having to 
assume responsibility for funding these liabilities paid for by future taxpayers. The estimated 
liability was about £40bn in 2004 when it was assumed, but by 2007, estimates had escalated to 
more than £70bn. So policy-makers in the UK should be acutely aware of the risks of guarantees 
and should not easily be fooled by covert subsidies and guarantees. 
Given the time-scale for new orders, which does not anticipate their being placed for seven years 
or more, it is doubtful whether today’s commitments from companies and government are worth 
anything. Energy market circumstances will change continuously for the next seven years and a 
commercial company operating in a competitive market will be able to claim that their 
commitment not to need subsidies had been overtaken by changes in energy markets. Equally, the 
government in seven years will have little connection to today’s government and will not feel 
bound by today’s commitments. The suspicion must therefore be that statements by government 
and companies are only possible because those involved know they will not have to deliver on 
these commitments. 
                                       
40 Daily Telegraph, July 13, 2006, p 1, ‘Grid 'will pay £1.4bn extra' for N-stations Transmission group must 
upgrade to cope with planned power plants’ 
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Appendix 1 Discounting, cost of capital & required 
rate of return 
A particularly difficult issue with nuclear economics is dealing with and putting on a common 
basis for comparison, the streams of income and expenditure at different times in the life of 
nuclear power plant. Under UK plans, the time from placing of reactor order to completion of 
decommissioning could span more than 200 years. 
Conventionally, streams of income and expenditure incurred at different times are compared 
using discounted cash flow (DCF) methods. These are based on the intuitively reasonable 
proposition that income or expenditure incurred now should be weighted more heavily than 
income or expenditure earned in the future. For example, a liability that has to be discharged now 
will cost the full amount but one that must be discharged in, say, 10 years can be met by investing 
a smaller sum and allowing the interest earned to make up the additional sum required. In a DCF 
analysis, all incomes and expenditures through time are brought to a common basis by 
‘discounting’. If an income of US$100 is received in one year’s time and the ‘discount rate is 5 
per cent, the ‘net present value’ of that income is US$95.23 – a sum of US$95.23 would earn 
US$4.77 in one year to make a total of US$100. The discount rate is usually seen as the 
‘opportunity cost’ of the money, in other words, the rate of return (net of inflation) that would be 
earned if the sum of money was invested in an alternative use. 
Whilst this seems a reasonable process over periods of a decade or so and with relatively low 
discount rates, over long periods, with high discount rates, the results of discounting can be very 
powerful and the assumptions that are being made must be thought through. For example, if the 
discount rate is 15 per cent, a cost incurred in 10 years of US$100 would have a net present value 
of only US$12.28. A cost incurred in 100 years, even if the discount rate was only 3 per cent, 
would have a net present value of only US$5.20, while at a discount rate of 15 per cent, costs or 
benefits more than 15 years forward have a negligible value in an normal economic analysis (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1 Impact of discounting: Net present values 
Discounting period 
(years) 
3% 15% 
5  0.86 0.50 
10 0.74 0.25 
15 0.64 0.12 
20 0.55 0.061 
30 0.41 0.015 
50 0.23 0.00092 
100 0.052 - 
150 0.012 - 
Source: Author’s calculations 
If we apply this to nuclear plants operating in a competitive market where the cost of capital will 
be very high, this means that costs and benefits arising more than, say 10 years in the future will 
have little weight in an evaluation of the economics of a nuclear power plant. Thus increasing the 
life of a plant from 30 years to 60 years will have little benefit, while refurbishment costs incurred 
after, say 15 years will equally have little impact. 
For decommissioning, for which under UK plans the most expensive stage is not expected to be 
started until 135 years after plant closure, this means very large decommissioning costs will little 
impact even with a very low discount rate consistent with investing funds in a very secure place 
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with a low rate of return, such as 3 per cent. If we assume a Magnox plant will cost about 
US$1.8bn to decommission and the final stage accounts for 65 per cent of the total 
(undiscounted) cost (US$1170m), a sum of only US$28m invested when the plant is closed will 
have grown sufficiently to pay for the final stage of decommissioning. 
The implicit assumption with DCF methods is that the rate of return specified will be available 
for the entire period. Give that even government bonds, usually seen as the most secure form of 
investment, are only available for 30 years forward, and that a period of 100 years of sustained 
economic growth is unprecedented in human history, this assumption seems difficult to justify. 
So, with nuclear power, there is the apparent paradox that at the investment stage, a very high 
discount rate (or required rate of return) of 15 per cent or more is likely to be applied to determine 
whether the investment will be profitable, while for decommissioning funds, a very low discount 
rate is applied to determine how much decommissioning funds can be expected to grow. 
The key element resolving this paradox is risk. Nuclear power plant investment has always been 
risky because of the difficulty of controlling construction costs, the variability of performance, 
the risk of the impact of external events on operation and the fact that many processes are yet to 
be fully proven (such as disposal of high level waste and decommissioning). In a competitive 
environment, there are additional risks because of the rigidity of the cost structure. Most of the 
costs will be incurred whether or not the plant is operated. Thus while nuclear plants will do well 
when the wholesale price is high (as was the case with British Energy from 1996-99), they will do 
poorly when the wholesale price is low (2000-2002). The fact that plant has made good profits for 
a decade will not protect it from bankruptcy in the bad years and financiers will therefore see 
investment in nuclear power as extremely risky and will apply a very high interest rate reflecting 
the risk that the money loaned could easily be lost. 
